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 Abstract
This case study examined the communications methods 
and results of Florida’s agricultural communicators during 
the Mediterranean fruit fly infestations  of 1997 and 1998. 
Eight agricultural communicators actively participating in 
the communications efforts during the infestations were 
interviewed. Findings included the following: activist groups 
were able to “strike first” and control the media messages 
for a period of time that was damaging to the agricultural 
industry’s efforts of spraying malathion, the agricultural 
community often discounted activists as extremists whose 
arguments were invalid and without merit, and personal 
relationships and personal contacts were essential for the 
agricultural community to calm the public’s environmental 
and health fears.
In 1997 and 1998, Florida’s agricultural community was forced 
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about the Mediterranean fruit fly (Medfly) and the control methods 
used to eradicate the pest when the Medfly threatened the state’s 
$6.8 billion agricultural industry. Activist groups were able to get the 
attention of the mass media by challenging the use of the insecticide 
malathion, asserting that the chemical poses health and environmen-
tal risks. Local and state media picked up the story of both the Med-
fly infestation and subsequent protests, often leading to front-page 
stories. The activists also pressured governmental agencies to revoke 
the temporary permit allowing the use of aerial malathion bait spray, 
the most efficient and effective means of eradicating the destructive 
fly, according to state agricultural officials. Agricultural communica-
tors representing both private industry and the governmental agen-
cies legally charged with eradicating the pest, defended the use of 
malathion as part of an overall Medfly eradication plan designed to 
protect the economic contributions made by agriculture as well as 
the landscapes and gardens of Floridians. 
The agriculture industry faces problems that no other industry 
faces and must communicate about a staggering number of com-
plicated issues; yet there remains a lack of documented cases from 
which industry professionals and students can learn. Therefore, 
the purpose of this case study was to examine Florida agricultural 
communicators’ communications efforts and methods during the 
Mediterranean fruit fly infestations of 1997 and 1998.
Methods and Procedures
This qualitative study was conducted using a descriptive case 
study technique in which a detailed account of the selected phenom-
enon—the agricultural community’s communications efforts regard-
ing the 1997 and 1998 infestations of the Mediterranean fruit fly—is 
presented. A primary advantage of the case study methodology is 
that it allows the researcher to obtain a wealth of information and 
provide detail about this research topic (Wimmer & Dominick, 1987). 
Merriam (1998) observed that a case study design is employed to 
gain an in-depth understanding of the situation and that “the primary 
interest is in process rather than outcomes, in context rather than 
specific variables, in discovery rather than confirmation” (p.19).
The data-gathering method was face-to-face interviews conducted 
during fall 1998. Eight interviews were conducted with members of 
the agricultural community who actively participated in the commu-
nications regarding the 1997 and 1998 Medfly infestations. The com-
municators represented industry associations, Florida Cooperative 
Extension at the University of Florida (UF), the U.S. Department of 
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Agriculture, and the Florida Department of Agriculture and Consum-
er Services (DACS). Professors in UF’s Department of Agricultural 
Education and Communication, and in the College of Journalism 
and Communications; and public relations professionals represent-
ing the Florida Agriculture Institute, an organization of agricultural 
communications professionals, refined the questions before the eight 
interviews were conducted. All interviews were recorded, transcribed, 
and analyzed.
In addition to the primary data gathered, secondary sources of 
information were reviewed and used to develop the interview ques-
tions, as well as to fill in the details of the events that occurred during 
the Medfly infestations of 1997 and 1998. An informal content review 
(not content analysis) was conducted of newspaper coverage re-
lated to the Medfly infestations, as well as reviewed memos, letters, 
electronic mail, and trade publications. The purpose of this review 
was to become as familiar as possible with what was presented in the 
mass media as well as to be able to understand and respond to any 
comments made about mass media coverage by those interviewed. 
In reporting the findings, the interviewees were randomly assigned 




In late May 1997, a Mediterranean fruit fly was found in a trap in 
Hillsborough County, Fla. Aerial spraying of malathion began June 
5 over the town of Brandon, near Tampa. At that time, state agri-
culture officials assured the public about the safety of malathion.  
“Malathion is just about the safest of all pesticides being used,” said 
a biologist with the state Agricultural Department’s Division of Plant 
Industry (“Attack on Medfly set to begin,” 1997). By mid-June, the 
spray area had expanded to 300 square miles and Commissioner of 
Agriculture Bob Crawford publicly declared an “all-out assault” on 
the Medfly when it was detected in Lakeland, the heart of the state’s 
citrus production area, between Tampa and Orlando. Whenever 
Medflies are detected in the United States, an immediate quarantine 
is put into effect, meaning fruit cannot be moved out of the area until 
it has been inspected and treated appropriately to ensure compliance 
with regulations—which may mean cold storage, drying, canning, 
processing, fumigation, limitations on open transportation and open 
display of produce and lasts approximately 46 days after the last 
malathion application. Food grown within 4.5 miles of a Medfly find 
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falls under quarantine restrictions. By early August, the Florida citrus 
industry began to worry that the quarantine would negatively impact 
early citrus crops in the Tampa-Lakeland area, especially since the 
mandatory fumigation associated with the quarantine could cost sev-
eral hundred dollars per truckload of fruit (Sloan, 1997). The 1997 
infestation ended with 748 flies having been trapped in five counties, 
primarily in the central Florida area between Tampa and Orlando; 
and with 82 different crops being quarantined in areas where Med-
flies were found.
A second infestation outbreak in 1998 began with the discovery of 
a Medfly in south Florida’s Dade County (Miami) on April 1; ground 
application of malathion began almost immediately. The 1998 
infestation also flared up in rural parts of Lake and Manatee coun-
ties. (These counties are northwest of Orlando and south of Tampa, 
respectively.) Although the eradication program was initially limited 
to ground application of malathion in all Medfly-infested counties, 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) approved a request to 
aerially apply malathion over areas in Manatee County, just south of 
Tampa.
Communications and Controversy 
CRAM! (Citizens for Responsible Application of Malathion!), a 
Hillsborough County-based activist group, formed in June 1997 in 
response to eradication plans. Although membership was initially 
small, it swelled to hundreds in just two weeks (“Another Medfly 
found, spraying in largest citrus county to begin,” 1997). CRAM! 
members were vocal opponents of malathion, particularly when 
sprayed aerially. On its Web site, CRAM! states, “The State of Florida 
is trying to save the citrus industry at the expense of the land and our 
lives” (CRAM!, 1998). The organization encouraged citizens to join 
CRAM! because “every single person who helps will aid us in stopping 
this wholesale poisoning of the people, the animals, and the land 
for the sake of the orange juice and petroleum industries” (CRAM!, 
1998). The group collected signatures on petitions of protest against 
the eradication program, eventually succeeding in getting an ad-
ministrative judge to invalidate the emergency rule that allowed the 
malathion application (“Judge rules against Medfly spraying,” 1997).
Although less mentioned in the newspapers in 1997, SCRAM 
(Sarasota/Manatee Citizens Rally Against Malathion) was more suc-
cessful in preventing aerial application of malathion. SCRAM man-
aged to raise enough opposition to aerial malathion spraying that 
state officials agreed only to apply malathion to the ground 200 
4
Journal of Applied Communications, Vol. 85, Iss. 1 [2001], Art. 1
https://newprairiepress.org/jac/vol85/iss1/1
DOI: 10.4148/1051-0834.2158
Journal of Applied Communications, Vol. 85, No. 1, 2001 / 11
meters around the finds (Hollingsworth, 1997a). SCRAM paid to fly in 
industry experts from California to discuss health and environmental 
issues related to the eradication program. One of these experts was a 
California State University biologist who told the U.S. House of Rep-
resentatives that Florida’s Medfly eradication plan was “scientifically 
corrupt” (Hollingsworth, 1997a).
During the summer of 1997, newspaper articles—featuring 
complaints from parents, people with chemical sensitivities, organic 
farmers, and tropical fish farmers—about malathion use began 
regularly appearing in newspapers. As spraying reached Tampa’s 
most populated areas, the hotline established for public questions 
and comments was receiving up to 1,000 calls each day (“State ex-
pands spraying area as aerial war reaches downtown Tampa,” 1997), 
though none of the calls resulted in a confirmed case of malathion 
poisoning. Some state health officials asserted that state agriculture 
officials had not notified them before the eradication program began. 
(Hollingsworth, 1997b). Toward the end of the 1997 infestation, 
several newspaper articles were highly critical of malathion use and 
provided an opportunity for those who believed that their health had 
been impacted by malathion to air their complaints. Several articles 
in The Tampa Tribune asserted that malathion caused health prob-
lems in children.
The 1998 infestation was by far more widespread and involved 
more than twice the number of flies than were found in 1997, but 
most flies in 1998 were found in rural areas. Counties involved in the 
1997 infestation were predominantly urban. However, when it was 
announced in 1998 that aerial application would take place in urban 
areas of Manatee County, residents “screamed and hissed” at a panel 
of state agriculture and health officials (Kamins, 1998). SCRAM, 
teaming up with a group called Floridians Against Chemical Trespass 
(FACT), unsuccessfully attempted to take legal action to stop the 
spraying. Matthew McMilliam was the attorney for both CRAM! and 
SCRAM. In a letter to Marcia Mulkey of the EPA’s Office of Pesticides, 
McMilliam stated,  “My clients cannot think of anything which would 
allow them to accept the continued use of malathion.” (Matthew 
McMilliam, personal communication, April 20, 1998). A flier was dis-
tributed by an organization identifying itself as  “Kids Who Care” that 
described malathion as “a nerve gas” and listed symptoms of toxicity 
that are not consistent with those listed in medical or scientific litera-
ture for malathion (Fuller, 1998).
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Issues Management and Risk Communications
The Medfly infestations required agricultural communicators to 
practice issues management to address core concerns raised by the 
public and media about Medfly eradication. In their discussion of 
issues management, Heath and Cousino (1990) noted that certain is-
sues management functions were necessary for a company to oper-
ate without conflict from the public policy environment and to foster 
positive relationships with publics. These functions are:
1. involvement of public policy experts in strategic business 
planning and management,
2.  issue communication,
3. issue monitoring and analysis, and
4. efforts to meet changing standards of corporate social re-
sponsibility.
Although issues management may be the product of activism, 
Gaunt and Ollenburger (1995) point out that it is a proactive strategy 
that tries to identify issues and influence decisions regarding them 
before they can cause problems. In the case of the agricultural com-
munity and the Medfly infestation, issues management would most 
likely take the form of managing environmental and public health is-
sues before an infestation put them in the spotlight. Guth (1995) ob-
served that an inappropriate response to a crisis could pose tangible 
losses, such as damage to property or lost revenue, and intangible 
losses, such as a loss of public confidence in an organization.
Much of the agricultural communicators’ efforts also fell into the 
category of risk communications, which is communication spe-
cifically designed to convey messages about risks and the poten-
tial benefits from those risks. Public relations practitioner Adams 
(1992-93) made the following observations about how the media 
react to risk communication: a) the news media will generally ignore 
your organization’s experts in favor of government or activist sources, 
b) journalists often lack a knowledge of the environmental and/or 
scientific facts surrounding a particular risk, and c) a tendency exists 
for journalists to personalize a risk-related story. Adams (1992-93) 
asserted that if a practitioner is able to anticipate how and why 
journalists react to risk issues, it may be possible to “anticipate and/
or mitigate damage caused by inaccurate or incompetent reporting”  
(pp. 29-30).
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Findings
1. The Medfly infestation and resulting media coverage, par-
ticularly the coverage published in The Tampa Tribune, had 
significant impacts on the agricultural organizations af-
fected.
Andrew, an agricultural communicator, described the impact of 
the media on the public’s perception of the problem in the following 
way:
The media were able to strongly convince the public that malathion 
was going to kill them, malathion was going to cause damage to their 
children, they were going to have deformed babies in five years, it was 
going to get in the water supply, and everyone was going to be drink-
ing malathion. 
Many of the communicators said one particular environmental 
reporter for The Tampa Tribune wrote the most negative media 
reports. All of the agricultural communicators said this reporter’s 
aversion to chemical control methods was reflected in her writing 
and had a significant impact on how the general public—particularly 
those around Tampa—perceived the chemical control program. As 
another agricultural communicator, Catherine, said: 
If you’ve read a lot of (this reporter’s articles), you know she was a 
major factor in the problem. The fact that you had a reporter who 
wanted to spend so much time and clearly showed a bias in her pre-
sentation of the story had a huge impact on the public’s perception 
and the political perception of the issue.
All of the communicators cited The Tampa Tribune’s coverage 
of the issue as a major factor in the communications crisis that 
surrounded the 1997 Medfly infestation. The agricultural industry’s 
communicators also said the groups organized against the use of 
malathion were able to manipulate the media in such a way that the 
negative impacts were greater. Mary Ann, an agricultural public rela-
tions practitioner, said:
7
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[The activists’] message was simple, and they were loud, and they 
were very savvy with the media. They held up the petitions along the 
wall of the county commission meeting in Tampa so the TV cameras 
would get them on screen looking like the victims. They were holding 
rallies and were very visual. They would hold taped-together petitions 
that would run 30 feet long. They knew how to manipulate televi-
sion, and they had some very willing participants in the newspapers. I 
would say that CRAM! and, to some extent SCRAM down in Sarasota, 
had a huge impact on the public’s perception of the issue.
2. The activist groups were able to strike first and control the 
media message for a period of time that was damaging to 
the agricultural industry.
Most agricultural communicators indicated that activist groups 
were able to grab the attention of the media and promote their 
messages, unanswered by the agricultural community. Andrew aptly 
put it, “We were unprepared, and they had their facts together and 
their people speaking before we even realized what was going on.”  
Another communicator, Alex, said, “In 1997, we were late in under-
standing the level of public concern in the Tampa area—probably 
five weeks late. We were not focused early enough on the (public 
relations) needs of that program.”
A few of the communicators said they might have initially underes-
timated the potential for a public relations crisis because the activist 
groups were relatively small. The communicators expressed their 
belief that although the activist groups were not large, their level of 
organization allowed them to get out in front of the issue and control 
the messages. Alex said:
In proportion to their numbers, I think these groups had an incredible 
impact. Early on, they gained credibility with the media. Every time 
the USDA and the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 
would make a statement, CRAM! was recognized for the other side. 
They got a lot of ink. I think it was out of proportion to their numbers.
Communicators also expressed that one reason their organiza-
tions’ efforts were not immediately directed toward public relations 
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for the Medfly eradication was because they were busy with the com-
plex process of planning and implementing the eradication program 
itself. Catherine said:
I think the big communications error in 1997 was that project officials 
did not realize what the public relations downside of the whole Medfly 
program could be until late in the game. Initially, there were not 
enough communications officers and regular communication brief-
ings or releases in place.
3. The agricultural communicators often dismissed activists 
as extremists whose arguments were invalid and without 
merit.
Throughout the interviews, many communicators referred to activ-
ists, protesters, and anyone against the use of malathion by terms 
such as  “loonies,” “crazies,” and “tree-huggers.” The overall attitude 
was that the people who were against the application of malathion 
were misinformed and “anti-agriculture.” When addressing this issue, 
Catherine said:  
One of the criticisms I would have for my own industry is that there 
was a lack of appreciation for the personal convictions that the people 
who were doing this had. They weren’t just people who were mis-
informed or ignorant or had a hatred for the industry. A lot of them 
were intelligent, compassionate people who maybe had farming in 
their history, but they had genuine, sincere, heart-felt concern about 
their families’ health.  And there were some people whose heads 
weren’t screwed on tight all the way, too. But at least half of the group 
I witnessed were reasonable people who believed in their hearts that 
something was wrong. And we (agriculture) had to reach out to those 
people as an industry and not just roll over them. 
4. Although the agricultural communicators perceived that 
the Medfly eradication program and the associated agricul-
ture industry received negative press, the mass media also 
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delivered important, positive messages to the public for the 
agricultural community.
All of the communicators agreed that although the media, espe-
cially The Tampa Tribune during 1997, carried negative messages 
about the eradication program, the media also carried important 
messages for the agriculture industry to get to the general public. 
Agricultural communicator Mary Ann said newspapers other than 
The Tribune were more balanced in their approach to this issue. She 
said the newspapers in Orlando, Lakeland and St. Petersburg “didn’t 
have the alarmism in the headlines or in the stories that we saw in 
The Tampa Tribune. They made more of an effort to get agricul-
ture’s side of it.” Broadcast and print media discussed the potential 
financial impact to the state’s economy if the eradication was unsuc-
cessful, gave information about safety precautions to be taken during 
the malathion applications, and disseminated the spray schedules. 
Catherine said the media outside of Tampa “covered every angle 
possible without doing a commercial for the industry,” such as the 
potential economic impact of the Medfly infestation on citrus growers 
and the logistics of spraying schedules. 
5. None of the agricultural communicators’ organizations had 
a plan to specifically address communication needs related 
to a Medfly infestation; general crisis communication plans 
also were absent from most of the organizations.
Only one of the interviewees belonged to an organization that 
had what could be considered a formal crisis communication plan 
in place. Others had what they considered to be communications 
plans, but those generally consisted just of phone lists and the 
names of important contacts. Half of the communicators said they 
believed that plans were difficult to develop because “each crisis is 
different.”  Others said that they “just knew what to do when situa-
tions like this come up.” The sole organization that had a communi-
cations plan developed it after a 1990 Medfly infestation. Nicole said:
The last major eradication program was in 1990 in Miami. That was 
the first time there was any opposition of any type. Of course, that 
was still very minor. And after that, we came up with a formal pro-
gram for this. In fact, we trained 16 people to take homeowner calls.
6. The individual organizations within the agricultural commu-
nity were able to communicate consistent messages.
10
Journal of Applied Communications, Vol. 85, Iss. 1 [2001], Art. 1
https://newprairiepress.org/jac/vol85/iss1/1
DOI: 10.4148/1051-0834.2158
Journal of Applied Communications, Vol. 85, No. 1, 2001 / 17
The individual communicators sent clear and consistent mes-
sages to the public via the mass media. These messages included 
the economic importance of agriculture to the state’s economy, 
the importance of agriculture to the local economy, the agricultural 
community’s support for the eradication program, the potential for 
destruction should the pest go uncontrolled, and the proven efficacy 
and safety of the products being used in eradication.
The major factor that contributed to the consistency in mes-
sages and coordination of communication was the communicators’ 
participation in the Agriculture Institute of Florida, an association of 
communications professionals actively involved in the agricultural 
industry. Five of the communicators were members of the Agricul-
ture Institute’s board of directors at the time of the interview, and the 
remaining three belonged to organizations that were represented on 
the board.  The relationships established through participation in this 
professional organization formed a crucial foundation that enabled 
the communicators to network their communication efforts. In re-
gards to the impact of the Agriculture Institute, Catherine said:
It was nice to know that suddenly, when DACS (Department of 
Agriculture and Consumer Services) called and asked, “What are 
we going to do?” all you had to do was run down the list of the Ag 
Institute’s board of directors and you knew who the “A List” was. 
When you have a bunch of people on a list who know how to handle 
something like this and understand what needs to be done, that’s half 
of your crisis plan right there. It worked quite well because we knew 
each other already. We understood where offices were located, who 
was a good writer, who was a good schmoozer, who had computer 
savvy to make sure the data got transmitted, and who had connec-
tions in Tallahassee.
7. The communicators used a variety of media to get their 
messages disseminated, but personal relationships and 
personal contacts were essential in calming the public’s 
fears.
Television, newspapers, radio, brochures, phone hotlines, and 
Web sites were among media used by the communicators to get out 
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their messages regarding the Medfly infestations and control pro-
grams.  In addition, communicators recruited farmers from affected 
areas to give talks about the possible impacts the Medfly would have 
to their industry and their livelihoods. These speakers were perceived 
to be quite effective since they could give first-hand testimonials 
regarding the need for Medfly eradication.
In at least two counties, the communicators recruited volunteers 
from agriculture-related youth organizations to provide free car 
washes to residents in sprayed areas, because the protein in the 
spray could damage auto paint if not washed off in a timely man-
ner. The car washes generated good will toward the industry and the 
eradication program in the communities in which they were held.  In 
addition, communicators organized “town meetings” in two counties; 
citizens were invited to speak with local and state officials involved 
with the eradication program. Communicator Michelle described her 
organization’s efforts by saying:
The first thing we did was to inform community groups and local 
officials—mayors, council members, county commissioners, state 
legislators—from the affected areas. After that, we held press confer-
ences. We put out media alerts all of the time. We had town meet-
ings. We had public meetings at local schools to explain to the com-
munity what it is we found and why we had to treat it, what we were 
doing, how we were doing it, and when we were going to do it. And 
then, if you are talking about the Tampa Medfly eradication program, 
we set up a command post there. And every day we had two daily 
press briefings to tell local radio, TV, and print reporters, what we 
were doing that day, what area we were going to spray the next day, 
and what times the sprayings would happen.
8. Significant improvements were witnessed in the agricul-
tural community’s communications efforts during the 1998 
infestation when compared with its efforts during the 1997 
infestation.
All of the communicators agreed that the communications efforts 
during the 1998 infestation were much more effective and better 
organized than those in 1997. The communicators believed that 
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lessons learned by the USDA and DACS during the 1997 infestation 
improved the communications efforts in 1998. The biggest differ-
ence was that the 1998 communications efforts began long before 
any spraying took place. Communities were informed and consulted 
prior to the application of malathion. Nicole, a communicator for a 
governmental agency, said:
We learned that not only do people want to know what’s going on in 
their community, they also want to talk to you about it. They want to 
ask you questions. In 1998, we had public meetings in all of the com-
munities before we did anything.
Another important difference that likely contributed to less public 
outcry and negative publicity in the mass media was that one of the 
primary areas affected by the 1998 infestation was a rural community 
that had a stake in the agricultural health of the area and was more 
familiar with the use of pesticides.  
9. A need was recognized for agricultural organizations to 
establish more proactive communications within their com-
munities.
Most of the communicators indicated that they see a need for 
more communication between agriculturists and the communities 
in which they operate. They stressed the importance of building 
“good will” in communities and gaining the trust of local citizens and 
governmental entities. Bruce, a long-time agricultural communicator, 
said:
If you have not established your reputation as an organization or as an 
industry that is a contributor to its community—as being a valuable 
asset to the community—when you are in a crisis, the community 
will find no reason to support you. In agriculture, I think it’s especially 
difficult to do that because your farmers and your ranchers are the 
busiest people you’ll ever meet.  Mother Nature doesn’t take week-
ends off and neither do farmers, but we need for them to try, in order 
to contribute to the community.
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Conclusions/ Recommendations
The media’s reaction to the Medfly eradication efforts is consistent 
with the risk communication predictions made by Adams (1992-93): 
the media tended to favor the activists as sources of information, 
particularly at the height of the controversy;  journalists lacked 
knowledge and facts about malathion and eradication protocols; and 
there was a tendency for the journalists to personalize this risk-related 
story. Agricultural communicators who intend to be successful in 
avoiding communications crises can no longer afford to ignore or 
minimize environmental concerns. Not only must they closely moni-
tor the activity of activist groups in their localities, but also in many 
cases they must act as advisors to the leadership of their organiza-
tions regarding potential public relations pitfalls that may be associ-
ated with some courses of action.
A lack of crisis communication plans forced the agricultural com-
municators to “make it up as they went along.” Had they already 
developed plans, they may have been able to communicate faster 
initially and with more precision. In addition, the fact that few of the 
communicators adequately documented their communications ef-
forts during the two infestations is a significant opportunity lost.
A lack of issues management, monitoring, and analysis hampered 
the agricultural community’s ability to communicate about Medfly 
eradication in a timely manner in 1997. Although environmental 
issues have become prominent in the news media, the communica-
tors were caught unaware when activists organized and protested the 
use of malathion in urban areas. The activists were able to establish 
their position in the media unopposed for a period of several weeks. 
Incorporation of lessons learned during 1997 led to improved com-
munication efforts during the 1998 infestation. USDA and DACS 
became proactive in their communications efforts in 1998. It would 
be beneficial for communicators from all aspects of the agricultural 
industry to meet and establish specific responsibilities for both public 
and private entities prior to pest infestations. In addition in 1998, 
state and federal agencies employed communications methods that 
provided more input and interaction from the affected residents. 
The personal relationships and pre-established professional net-
work in the Florida Agriculture Institute was a key factor that allowed 
the communicators to provide consistent messages as soon as it 
was determined that outside organizations were needed to supple-
ment the government’s communication. Participation in this type of 
professional association is highly recommended for all agricultural 
communicators.
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Based on the findings of this study, it is recommended that the 
agricultural industry needs to build community “good will,” in order 
to raise awareness of the agricultural industry’s significance in the 
communities in which it operates. These communications need to be 
ongoing and should not end when a crisis is resolved.
Also, it is recommended that agricultural communicators take a 
close look at the demographics and the motivations of the activists 
involved in protests pertaining to environmental or health-sensitive is-
sues, such as the application of malathion or other chemicals. From 
mandated recycle bins in offices to increased demand for organically 
grown produce, signs point to a public that is more aware than ever 
of factors impacting the environment. Dismissing environmental 
activists as “loonies” and unreasonable people or discounting their 
points of view because of a perceived lack of agricultural knowledge 
has the potential to distance agriculture from mainstream society.
Key Words
Crisis communications, issues management, public relations, 
activisim/acitivists.
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